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Abstract
Work on electronic voting systems to date has largely fo-
cused around first-past-the-post voting. However, the gov-
ernments of many countries, and many non-governmental
organisations, use a single transferable vote system, in
which the voter needs to indicate not just a single preferred
candidate but a preference ranking of (some or all of) the
candidates on offer.
This paper investigates the possibility of modifying Preˆt
a` Voter to cope with a single transferable vote system. With
its newer form involving re-encryption mixes [8], this seems
at first sight to be impossible; with the older version based
on RSA onions [2], the obvious approach works, but se-
curity is less than ideal; using multiple re-encryption mix
onions for each vote, combined with a lazy decryption se-
mantics, however, proves to be an elegant and efficient so-
lution to the problem.
1. Introduction
Over the last few years, several electronic voting sys-
tems have been introduced that appear to offer a high level
of security. We have voter-verifiable receipts that yet can-
not be used to prove to a third party how one voted; we
have decryption and tallying processes that are publicly ver-
ifiable and yet do not allow individual encrypted votes to
be matched with their decrypted counterparts; we have dis-
tributed decryption phases that do not allow a single corrupt
machine to rig the election.
What is rather harder to find in the literature, however,
is the flexibility to cope with different voting and tallying
systems. Most of the energy expended to date has been fo-
cused on first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems, in which the
voter simply chooses a single candidate for election. En-
coding this information is typically a small enough task that
some attractive properties can be maintained: Preˆt a` Voter
allows re-encryption mixes that keep the onion size from
being affected by the number of tellers, and also allows the
random partial audit of the teller decryption phase to be run
arbitrarily often and with different links being uncovered
each time; Punchscan [5, 1] allows a mark daubed through
a small hole to encode the information cryptographically on
each of two sheets but so that both sheets are needed to read
the vote without decrypting; ThreeBallot [6] allows the vote
to be encoded by having the selected candidate’s name ap-
pearing on more sheets than the other names.
A notable exception here is Clarkson and Myers’
work [3] on modifying the re-encryption mix incarnation
of Preˆt a` Voter to deal with Condorcet elections. We shall
have more to say about this in Section 4.1.
The preponderance of FPTP e-voting systems is perhaps
explained by the fact that the origin of many of these sys-
tems is to be found in the UK or the USA, where both
national and local elections are run by FPTP. However, a
glance at the international scene shows that FPTP is far
from being the only voting system in real use. The single
transferable vote (STV) is used in the Republic of Ireland
for all national elections, and also for local and European
elections; STV is also the method of electing Senate and
for certain State elections in Australia; India uses it to elect
most members of its Upper House; Malta uses STV for all
elections; in the UK, although all English elections and Par-
liamentary elections are run by FPTP, STV is employed in
Northern Ireland and Scotland for local elections; and even
in the USA, which is heavily dominated by FPTP, some of-
ficial elections in Cambridge, MA, and Minneapolis, MN,
are run by STV. When one considers non-governmental or-
ganisations, STV appears even more popular: it is used by
student unions throughout the UK and increasingly in the
USA; for election to the General Synod of the Church of
England; and in countless other organisations. It is clear
that any e-voting system that wants a large potential market
needs to be able to deal effectively with STV.
This paper constitutes a detailed discussion on how to
modify Preˆt a` Voter to cope with STV. Accordingly, Sec-
tion 2 contains a brief summary of how STV works; in Sec-
tion 3 we then give an overview of the Preˆt a` Voter sys-
tem, with the original RSA onions and with the newer El-
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Figure 1. An STV ballot form
Gamal re-encryption mixes; the main contribution of this
paper then comes in Section 4 where we highlight the prob-
lems with a simplistic attempt to incorporate STV into Preˆt
a` Voter and then show how to overcome them; we then give
conclusions in Section 5.
2. The STV system
The basic notion to STV is, as the name suggests, that
one has only a single vote, but it may be transferred from
one candidate to another. This transfer is done when one’s
favoured candidate is eliminated from the race; so one
marks (with a ‘1’ rather than with a ‘×’) one’s chosen
candidate—say, Martha—but also indicates (with a ‘2’)
which candidate one would like if Martha were to be elim-
inated from the contest, and then one marks one’s next best
option (with a ‘3’), and so on (see Figure 1).
Tallying is done by initially sorting the piles of ballot pa-
pers according to first preferences. Each pile is counted, and
the candidate with the fewest first preferences is eliminated
from the contest. The ballot papers in that candidate’s pile
are then redistributed among the other piles according to the
second preferences indicated on the papers. (In the example
in Figure 1, if Martha were eliminated, this vote would then
go onto Brigitta’s pile.)
The piles are then counted again (with a transferred vote
given the same weight as a first-preference vote), and the
candidate with the smallest pile is once more eliminated,
and the votes are transferred again.
Three points of clarification are needed:
1. if a ballot form does not specify a ranking all the way
down, and all its specified candidates have been elimi-
nated, the ballot paper is then discarded;
2. if two or more candidates are in equal last place, the
candidate to be eliminated may be chosen by drawing
of lots, or by some other method (for example, count-
ing second preferences) according to the rules of the
specific election;
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Figure 2. A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
3. usually an STV count includes the notion of a quota,
which essentially determines the number of votes
needed such that one cannot be beaten regardless of
how the rest of the count goes. If there is only one can-
didate being elected, then the quota will be just over
half the votes, but it will be fewer if there is more than
one seat to be filled. When a candidate reaches the
quota, that candidate is declared elected, and his sur-
plus votes (the votes he has in excess of the quota) are
transferred, according to any of a variety of mecha-
nisms.
Discussion about STV elections for multiple seats with
fractional vote transfers is deferred to Section 5. For
the main body of the paper, we shall assume that votes
maintain their full value whenever they are transferred.
This is always the case in STV when a single winner
is to be returned.
The key points to note for this paper are that one’s vote
consists of a (possibly partial) ranking rather than a single
choice; that it is not enough simply to record how many
nth preferences each candidate has attracted for each n, be-
cause when transferring votes we need to identify the sec-
ond preferences indicated on the specific ballot papers being
discarded; and that in many cases some of the preferences
indicated on a ballot paper might not be used in the count
because the tallying process might finish (that is, a winner
might be declared) without the vote being transferred all the
way down to the last preference.
3. Preˆt a` Voter
The purpose of this section is to remind the reader of the
overall structure of Preˆt a` Voter and to recap on the salient
points. Space considerations forbid rehearsing every detail
here, and some familiarity with the system is assumed; for a
complete description the reader is advised to consult [2, 8].
A Preˆt a` Voter ballot form (suitable for FPTP) is shown
in Figure 2. The candidate list is given on the left-hand
side, and boxes are provided on the right-hand side for the
voter to cast his vote. When he has finished, he tears the
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ballot form down the middle and shreds the left-hand por-
tion containing the candidate names; the right-hand portion,
containing the vote, is fed into a scanner and the vote is
recorded; this right-hand portion is then retained and forms
the receipt.
The candidates are listed in some canonical ordering,
but with a random cyclic shift applied, with different bal-
lot forms having different shifts; consequently, the scanner,
which sees only the right-hand side, cannot interpret the
vote, and nor can the voter prove to a third party how he
voted. The cyclic shift is, however, embedded in the cryp-
togram at the bottom of the right-hand side of the ballot
form, so that the vote can be recovered later for the tallying
process. This cryptogram, the onion, has been encrypted
either several times, once each with the public keys of sev-
eral different machines (the tellers), or with a threshold key
whose decryption key is shared by the tellers, so that all
of these machines must participate in the decryption pro-
cess. The votes are processed all at the same time (or, at
least, in large batches), and when a teller processes a batch
of forms, it mixes them before passing them on to the next
teller. This ensures that when the votes have all been de-
crypted it is impossible for anyone to match an encrypted
vote with a decrypted vote. A mechanism is provided so
that this decryption process can be audited, and it can be
verified (neglecting a vanishingly small probability) that the
set of decrypted votes matches up (as a whole) with the set
of encrypted votes.
The precise nature of the encryption differs between the
two incarnations of Preˆt a` Voter. In each case, what follows
describes how Preˆt a` Voter works in the case of a FPTP
election, where a voter is required simply to choose a single
candidate.
3.1. Preˆt a` Voter with RSA onions
If there are n tellers, then the onion contains 2n lay-
ers. Construction of a ballot form means construction of a
pair (r, x), in which r is the shift that has been applied to the
candidate list on the form, and x is the multi-layered onion.
We start with r = 0 and x = 〈〉, and apply the following
procedure n times, once for each teller.
Suppose that the ballot form is currently (r, x). We gen-
erate a new random cyclic shift g, which will be an integer
in the range 0  g < k, where k is the number of candi-
dates. This value is called a germ. The new ballot form
becomes
(r ⊕k g, {g, x}PKi)
in which ‘⊕k’ represents addition modulo k, and ‘PKi’ de-
notes the current teller’s public key, and the encryption is
assumed to contain enough redundancy to foil guessing at-
tacks. A second layer for the same teller is then added; the
shift/onion pair now becomes
((r ⊕k g)⊕k g′, {g′, {g, x}PKi}PKi)
and we now move onto the next teller1. When all is done,
the first component gives the cyclic shift to be applied to the
candidate ordering on the printed form, and after printing
this value is discarded; this value can be recovered by the
teller chain as they iteratively strip off layers of the onion
and sum the embedded g-values (modulo k).
This results in quite large onions if there are several
tellers and the various security parameters (the amount of
redundancy included in the encryption) are high enough.
Accordingly, what is printed on the bottom of the right-hand
half of the ballot form is a signed hash of the onion. The
mapping from hashes to onions can be made public on a
web bulletin board.
The decryption phase involves sending the first teller the
value v of the vote, which will be an index into the shifted
candidate list as it appears on the ballot form, and the onion.
The teller removes the first layer, recovers the germ, and
subtracts this from v (modulo k). This gives a new vote
value, v′, which represents the same vote but according to
the cyclic shift determined by the germs in the remaining
layers of the onion. The teller then applies the same process
to the second layer, and passes the resulting v′′ and smaller
onion onto the second teller. What is left at the end of the
teller chain is a vote value representing the same vote but in
the canonical ordering.
Votes are decrypted in large batches. The teller decrypts
the outer layer of each vote, randomly reorders the batch,
and sends the result back to the web bulletin board; it then
removes its other layer, shuffles the batch again, and sends
the result back once more.
The purpose of giving two layers to each teller is to allow
random partial auditing of the teller’s actions, by forcing
the teller to reveal a random half of the first shuffle, and the
remaining half of the second shuffle, and prove that these
shuffles are as claimed. This gives no way of matching an
encrypted vote through the teller chain to an unencrypted
vote, but reduces the probability of the teller getting away
with manipulating n votes to 2−n.
3.2. Preˆt a` Voter with re-encryption mixes
The newer version of Preˆt a` Voter uses ElGamal to store
the encrypted cyclic shift. The mathematics of ElGamal en-
cryption is unimportant for this paper, but three key features
need noting.
1The original description of Preˆt a` Voter has two separate public keys
for each teller, one for the outer encryption layer and one for the inner
layer. This does not appear to add any extra security, however, and so here
we stick to one key per teller.
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1. An ElGamal encryption of a message m contains
buried within it a random value z of the same length
as the plaintext. The encryption, 〈m, z〉PK , is twice as
long as m.
2. Given an ElGamal encryption 〈m, z〉PK , it is possible
to change this value of z even without knowing m or z.
Thus, given just the ciphertext and the public key, one
can produce a ciphertext that looks different to anyone
not having the corresponding secret key, but decrypts
to the same value. This is known as re-encryption.
3. Given an ElGamal encryption 〈m, z〉PK , it is also possi-
ble to multiply m by a constant, within the encryption,
also without knowing anything except the ciphertext
and PK. In other words, one can produce 〈p · m, z〉PK
from 〈m, z〉PK without knowing m or z. In Preˆt a` Voter,
the secret value s is always encrypted as m = γs for
some fixed and public γ; the effect of this is that now
one can add a constant t to s inside the encryption
by using the aforementioned technique to multiply the
plaintext by γt.
From this point onwards, we will write ‘(s, z)PK’ as
shorthand for ‘〈γs, z〉PK’. The two points given above
mean that from (s, z)PK and PK it will be possible to
produce another value (s+ t, z′)PK that looks unrelated
to anyone not possessing the decryption key.
The ElGamal version of Preˆt a` Voter uses ballot forms
containing an ‘onion’ with a single layer; if the cyclic shift
applied to the candidate list is g then the onion will be
(−g, z)PK for some z. (The onion is produced by a dis-
tributed process so that no single entity knows the value
of g, but this need not concern us here.) The decryption
key is a threshold key, and each teller has a share of it; an
appropriately large numbers of tellers, therefore, need to act
together to decrypt an onion.
The anonymising/mixing phase and the decryption phase
are kept separate in this version of Preˆt a` Voter. Before the
mixing phase takes place, each ballot form, containing a
vote v and an onion (−g, z)PK , is changed to contain a single
value of (v−g, z)PK . Now v−g, taken modulo k, represents
the vote in the canonical ordering.
For the anonymising/mixing phase, the first teller re-
ceives a batch of ballot forms, each now containing a single
onion into which the vote value has been absorbed. The
teller re-encrypts each onion, randomly reorders them, and
sends them back; it then performs the same process, re-
encrypting and reordering them once more, and sends them
back again. The batch is then passed to the next teller. When
it has passed right through the teller chain, the mixing pro-
cess is complete. A random partial audit can be performed
in exactly the same way as with RSA onions, with one neat
twist: in the case of a dispute, the anonymising mix can be
People’s Front of Judea 1
Judean People’s Front 1
People’s Front of Judea 2
Judean People’s Front 2
Judean People’s Front 3
People’s Front of Judea 3
Figure 3. An STV ballot form in the canonical
ordering
1
6
3
2
4
5
Figure 4. A cyclic shift leaks too much
performed as many times as is required, with a new audit
each time, because with each run the intermediate values
will be different.
The decryption phase simply involves the tellers using
their shares to decrypt each (anonymised) vote. This gives
a complete set of decrypted votes in the canonical ordering,
and the votes can then be tallied in the usual way.
4. STV and Preˆt a` Voter
At first sight, the obvious attempt to modify Preˆt a` Voter
to deal with STV involves keeping the cyclic shift of the
candidate order to protect anonymity, but changing the in-
formation embedded in the vote itself to something that rep-
resents a (possibly partial) ranking of candidates.
However, this leaks too much information. (This is sug-
gested in [2] but not demonstrated.) Suppose the ballot
form, in the canonical ordering, reads as in Figure 3. If a
random cyclic shift is applied to this ballot form, and we
afterwards see an encrypted receipt that looks like Figure 4,
it is not difficult to make a good guess as to what the cyclic
shift was. There is a strong likelihood that this vote is going
to rank the three candidates representing the People’s Front
of Judea above their bitter rivals from the Judean People’s
Front, or vice versa; the only cyclic shift that fits with this is
the one with ‘Judean People’s Front 1’ as the name at the
top of the ballot form. What is needed is for the ballot form
(and, hence, the onion) to contain a random permutation of
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candidate names.
4.1. Re-encryption mixes
Work by Clarkson and Myers [3] has already shown how
Condorcet can be incorporated into Preˆt a` Voter in its re-
encryption mix incarnation. In a Condorcet election, each
voter submits a complete ranking of the candidates accord-
ing to preference; tallying is then done by making pairwise
comparisons between candidates and determining, for each
pair, which would win in a straight vote between the two.
Each ballot form is considered, and the number of ballot
forms with candidate A ranked above candidate B is com-
pared with the number ranking B above A. When all pairs
have been considered, the candidate who wins most pairings
is declared the winner.
Clarkson and Myers solve the problem by treating a
ranking of k candidates as being 12k(k − 1) miniature ballot
forms each expressing a preference between two candidates.
Although this generates O(k2) onions, each onion is small
because the ElGamal ‘onions’ are single layer and their size
does not vary with the number of tellers involved. The ap-
proach is attractive because it eliminates the possibility of
looking for the occurrence of a particular ballot form when
the decryption phase is finished: there is nothing to connect
one decrypted pairwise ranking to another that originated
on the same ballot form.
This is important because it avoids the possibility of us-
ing lower-ranked (and, thus, less important) preferences as
a covert channel in a system like Preˆt a` Voter where the de-
crypted ballot forms are made publicly viewable after the
election. We shall return to this point in Section 4.2.2.
Unfortunately, it does not appear to be possible to get a
full permutation into an ElGamal onion. In order to pre-
serve anonymity, an essential first step before the mixing is
to fold the vote into the onion so that what is left is a vote
according to the canonical ordering. This cannot be done
here, because we would need to be able to take a completed
encrypted ballot form constructed as 〈πg, z〉PK along with a
vote πv, where πg and πv are now permutations, and produce
〈πv ◦πg, z〉PK , in which ‘πv ◦πg’ denotes the composition of
the two permutations. There does not seem to be any way of
representing these permutations in a way that is malleable
inside an ElGamal encryption, because permutations cannot
be encoded as integers in such a way that the composition
of the two permutations is cashed out as the product or the
sum of the two integers. (For a start, composition of permu-
tations does not commute.)
4.2. RSA onions
With RSA onions, the story is different. Here, each
onion layer is removed by its teller, and combining the vote
with the germ is done after decryption. This allows for en-
coding the permutation according to any reasonably concise
scheme. Each layer i of the onion contains some permu-
tation πi, and the candidate ordering on the ballot form is
then the product of all of these permutations, applied to the
canonical ordering. At each stage of the decryption process,
when a layer is removed and a germ πi is recovered from the
onion, the teller applies πi−1 to the vote to get it into the or-
dering represented by the rest of the onion. At the end of
the process, the vote has been transformed into a vote under
the canonical ordering and tallying can proceed as before.
(It is suggested in [2] that STV can be dealt with in this
system by using a publicly known hash of the germs embed-
ded in the onions to create a permutation. We see no reason
not to embed the full permutation in the onion, so that is
the approach outlined above, but the analysis that follows
applies equally well to either method.)
This simple switch of an index value for a permutation,
in both the vote and the onion, is sufficient to make the sys-
tem work with STV. However, there are problems with the
security.
4.2.1 Tracking sets across the teller chain
A vote under STV need not be a full permutation (in con-
trast to Condorcet, for example). The ballot paper in Fig-
ure 1 is a valid ballot under the STV semantics; once the
three indicated candidates have been eliminated, the bal-
lot form is discarded and its vote is lost. However, this
means that it is evident from the receipt how many candi-
dates have been selected. Since the encrypted receipts and
the decrypted votes are published on the web bulletin board,
and since in each case one can see how many entries there
are on the ballot form, it is possible to partition both sets
according to the number of entries, and match these sets (as
complete sets) between the encrypted receipts and the de-
crypted votes.
This problem may perhaps be regarded as an intrinsic
property of STV. If the receipt is to be verifiable by eye
then either it must show how many entries were made or
some extra information must be encoded and checked; any
solution will naturally complicate the issue and make the
voter’s job harder. We will discuss a possible solution to this
shortly. Let us note in passing, however, that automatically
and randomly allocating rankings to boxes that the voter has
left unfilled is out of court from the start: this might affect
the result of the election. When we do the tallying, we will
no longer be following the STV semantics; whatever the
pros and cons of such a voting system, it is certainly not
equivalent to STV, and since the aim is to implement STV,
we cannot follow this path.
This matching of sets might also be considered fairly
harmless in a large election if we are confident of large sets
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Figure 5. Auditing in Preˆt a` Voter
Figure 6. Attempting to track a vote
in each case. There is an additional wrinkle, however.
Recall that the decryption phase takes batches of votes
down the teller chain, with the votes being shuffled at each
stage, and partial random audits employed to verify that the
tellers are operating according to their brief. Each teller
performs two decryptions and shuffles, and the random au-
diting reveals half the links for the first shuffle, and the cor-
responding half for the second shuffle. In Figure 5, audit-
ing of a single teller is shown operating on ten votes. The
teller has disclosed information to enable the revealed links,
shown as dashed lines, to be publicly verified.
An attempt to use the links to track a vote from end to
end is very quickly defeated by the large number of pos-
sible paths. Figure 6 has a single vote highlighted on the
left-hand side; this gives rise to a single vote in the middle
column; but half the votes on the right-hand side are possi-
ble matches. If there were several tellers, this effect would
be quickly multiplied across the chain. A formal analysis of
this in [4] provides clear evidence that this shuffling process
does its job effectively.
But, as we have noted, an encrypted vote still reveals the
number of preferences indicated on the ballot form. This is
true not just for the initial encrypted vote but for its partial
decryptions at every stage along the teller chain. We can
partition the sets of votes all the way through.
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Figure 7. Tracking an individual vote
Figure 7 shows a teller audit in which one of the partition
sets has been identified and highlighted in each of the three
columns. The darker vote in the left-hand column clearly
must match with the darker one in the middle column, be-
cause this link has been revealed; but we see immediately
that there is also only one possibility for its location in the
right-hand column, because it has to be one of the votes in
the partition set and it must be one whose link with the mid-
dle column is not revealed.
Even though there are four votes in the set, we have man-
aged to link one on the left with one on the right. This is
because the partition set has not been split in half by the
choice of audit links. It would be more efficient to make
sure that the audit links are chosen to force this to happen;
or, equivalently, to run each partition set one by one through
the teller chain and audit process.
However, we can do better. We can include a dummy
‘stop’ candidate in the election, whose name need not ap-
pear on the ballot form but is always implicitly in last place
in the candidate list, and whose appearance in the ranking
is to be taken as an indication that this is the point at which
the voter made no further choices. What the booth does is to
add this candidate’s index to the ranking as the next ranking
after those specified by the voter, and then fill in the remain-
ing places arbitrarily. This way, the encrypted vote and the
fully decrypted vote still show how many candidates were
selected (because the highest number always indicates the
‘stop’ candidate), but during the decryption process the ran-
dom permutations will move this value around at each stage,
and no-one will be able to identify it. End-to-end partition-
ing is still possible, but not tracking across the chain.
4.2.2 Covert channels
This method of implementing STV gives us no protection
against the issue raised above of using lower-ranked prefer-
ences as covert channels.
Suppose we have an election involving ten candidates,
one of whom is Alice. This means that there are 9! =
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Alice 1
Esther 2
Duncan 3
Harriet 4
Jonathan 5
Bob 6
George 7
Charlie 8
Isobel 9
Fred 10
Figure 8. ‘The Italian Attack’
362, 880 different complete rankings of candidates that put
Alice at the top. She can coerce Norman to vote for her as
his first preference by stipulating a particular one of these
rankings (say, the ranking given in Figure 8) that she wants
him to enter on the form, on pain of unpleasantness to fol-
low if he disobeys. Although she cannot tell from his re-
ceipt whether he has done her bidding, she can check the
decrypted votes afterwards to see whether this exact vote
sequence appears anywhere, and take her frustration out on
Norman if she cannot find it. Unless the electorate is huge,
this exact ranking is unlikely to appear by chance; certainly
Norman would be a brave man to take the risk.
This is a consequence of the attempt to split the prob-
lem into two stages: first decrypt the (anonymous) votes,
and then tally them. Any system that publishes the full de-
crypted votes will be subject to this type of attack.
The attack given here is not new—it is sometimes re-
ferred to as ‘The Italian Attack’—but it does not seem to
appear in the literature anywhere.
For FPTP, there is really no sensible middle ground when
it comes to decrypting a vote: either one completely de-
crypts it, or one does not decrypt it at all. And since the
(usual) FPTP semantics require the vote tally for all candi-
dates to be published, rather than simply the ranking of the
candidates or even just the name of the winning candidate,
it is evident that all of the votes will need to be decrypted.
On the other hand, there is no equivalent of the Italian vot-
ing attack with FPTP because the information encoded in a
vote is so little, so the problem does not arise.
With STV, however, the amount of information buried in
a vote is much greater, but not all of the information will
necessarily be required to complete the tallying. The infor-
mation that is present in the entire set of decrypted votes but
not needed for tallying falls under three headings:
Unused preferences. Some of a voter’s preferences never
get considered because the vote is allocated to the win-
ner’s pile before all of the preferences are used. In the
case of a single seat election, any rankings lower than
that of the eventual winner will never be needed; even
rankings above may not be needed if the eventual win-
ner hits quota soon enough.
Transfer history. When ballot paper’s second preference
is eliminated, and we uncover the third preference and
reallocate the vote, we do not need to know what the
first preference was; in other words, the transfer his-
tory of this ballot paper is irrelevant. As long as we
have the information to transfer the right votes to the
right piles, we can still tally accurately.
Absolute rankings. When a candidate is eliminated and
his votes are transferred, we obviously need to know
how to distribute these votes across the other piles. The
next preference down on the list needs to be uncovered
so that we can work out who should next receive the
vote. What we do not need to know, however, is the
absolute ranking that the transferred ballot paper spec-
ified for the eliminated candidate or for the new can-
didate. It makes no difference whether this is a first
preference that has been ruled out and we are moving
to the second preference, or this is a sixth preference
that has been ruled out and we are moving to the sev-
enth.
By publishing the full decrypted votes, we open our-
selves up to attacks that use covert channels. Clearly what
is wanted is a lazy evaluation semantics for the encrypted
votes that releases the information only when it is required
for the tallying.
Achieving this with RSA onions, it turns out, is
harder and less elegant than returning to ElGamal and re-
encryption mixes.
4.3. Multi-valued re-encryption mixes
The idea behind the solution is to encode the vote as a
sequence 〈c1, . . . , ck〉 of cryptograms, each ultimately de-
crypting to a candidate identifier (such as an index into
the canonical ordering of candidate names). Initially all
the heads (first components) of the votes, representing the
first preferences, are decrypted, and the votes are sorted into
piles. The smallest pile needs redistributing; we take each
vote, detach the head (representing the eliminated candi-
date), and pad the tail so that the length of the sequence
is maintained, and decrypt the new head. These modified
votes are then placed into the appropriate piles and each
pile is anonymised and mixed so that the transferred votes
cannot be distinguished from the original votes. We now
count the piles once more, and continue as before. As soon
as we reach a point where one candidate has more than half
of the votes, we stop and declare a winner.
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[[Alice]]PKR [[Alice]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKR [[Bob]]PKT
[[Charlie]]PKR [[Charlie]]PKT
[[Duncan]]PKR [[Duncan]]PKT
[[Esther]]PKR [[Esther]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
Figure 9. Initial creation of the ballot form
4.3.1 Constructing the onions and votes
More precisely, each ballot form (for an STV election to re-
turn one winner from k candidates) contains a signed hash;
this hash is used as a look-up to retrieve k + 1 ElGamal
‘onions’. The first k are ElGamal terms of the form 〈i, z〉PKT ,
where i is an index into the canonical ordering, z is a ran-
dom value (different for each onion), and PKT is a public
key corresponding to a threshold ElGamal secret key that
the tellers will use for decryption. The first k onions will
cover values from i = 1 to i = k, but in a randomised order,
corresponding to the order of the candidate names printed
on the left-hand side. The last onion is called the ‘stop’
onion and it contains the value i = 0; it performs a function
analogous to that of the ‘stop’ candidate of Section 4.2.1.
The construction of the ballot form can be made subject to
the same random auditing that is performed in the FPTP
version of Preˆt a` Voter.
4.3.2 Distributed creation of the ballot form
Creation of the form is similar to that of FPTP Preˆt a` Voter
with re-encryption mixes. We assume that we have a public
key PKR corresponding to a threshold ElGamal decryption
key whose shares are held by a set of registrars; these regis-
trars will be involved in the on-demand printing of a ballot
form. The tellers also share a threshold key whose public
complement is PKT . We further assume some set of l clerks
who will randomise the ordering on the ballot form.
Initially the ballot form is created as depicted in Figure 9.
We use ‘[[Alice]]PK’ to represent an ElGamal onion encrypt-
ing Alice’s index in the (public) list of candidates in the
canonical order, using the public key PK. On each side we
have a sequence of onions that, when decrypted, together
give an ordering of the candidate list. At the bottom, on the
right-hand side, we also have a ‘stop’ onion.
The ballot form now gets passed through the chain of
clerks. Each one chooses a random permutation and applies
it to both sides of the ballot form, but leaving the ‘stop’
onion where it is. The clerk now re-encrypts each compo-
nent so that no-one will be able to tell what the ordering is
without the relevant decryption key. The ballot form we are
[[Charlie]]PKR [[Charlie]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKR [[Bob]]PKT
[[Esther]]PKR [[Esther]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKR [[Alice]]PKT
[[Duncan]]PKR [[Duncan]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
Figure 10. A reordered ballot form
Charlie
Bob 3
Esther 1
Alice
Duncan 2
STOP
w4JKz
Figure 11. A completed ballot form
left with is as in Figure 10: it is as before but with the order
permuted. Only the registrars can read the candidate list on
the left-hand side; only the tellers can read the onions on the
right-hand side.
The forms are made subject to the same kind of random
audit check as in the FPTP version of Preˆt a` Voter.
Each ballot form is then stored on the web bulletin board,
along with a signed hash. The form can be printed by any
threshold set of registrars.
4.3.3 Voting
The voter fills in the ballot form exactly as before. The re-
ceipt contains the ranking in the order entered on the form,
plus a signed hash of the sequence of teller onions (includ-
ing the ‘stop’ onion).
The booth simply sends to the web bulletin board the
information that is on the receipt. It does not even need
to know the teller onions; it just sends the permutation for
publication, and the signed hash so that the web bulletin
board knows which ballot form is being used.
The web bulletin board first publishes this (possibly par-
tial) ranking, along with the signed hash; the candidate or-
der is random so this does not allow anyone to read the vote.
It also converts the vote into a form suitable for processing
by the tellers by using the ranking entries as indices into the
sequence of teller onions it has stored.
Suppose the voter has completed the ballot form, and it
now looks like the one in Figure 11. The ‘STOP’ row does
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5
3
1
6
2
4
w4JKz
[[Charlie]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKT
[[Esther]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKT
[[Duncan]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
w4JKz
[[Esther]]PKT
[[Duncan]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
[[Charlie]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKT
w4JKz
Figure 12. Converting the vote
not appear on the printed form, but it is implicitly always
in last place; because it does not appear on the form, it can
never have a ranking written next to it. Right at the bottom
of the form is written the signed hash of the onion sequence
stored by the web bulletin board.
The first step is to pad the ranking so that it is a complete
permutation. The first unused rank is assigned to the ‘stop’
position; any remaining blank boxes are then filled in in-
creasing order from top to bottom. (The order in which the
boxes are filled does not make any difference, but it is im-
portant that it is done by a deterministic mechanism so that
there is no possibility of allowing the web bulletin board
to use its choice of ordering as a covert channel to leak in-
formation; filling the boxes from top to bottom is the easi-
est way of making the process deterministic.) The result is
the first column in Figure 12. Then the web bulletin board
looks up the teller onion sequence by using the hash, and
retrieves the middle column of Figure 12. The web bulletin
board cannot decrypt the onions, but it does know that their
order corresponds to the candidate order on the ballot form.
(It does also know that the ‘stop’ onion is in the last place,
because this is always where it comes.) Now it produces
the converted vote by reordering the onions it has retrieved
according to the ranking it has just padded. The result is
the third column in Figure 12. This gets published as it is,
with no re-encryption performed, so that the conversion can
be publicly verified. The burden on the individual voter is
simply to check that the receipt matches the partial ranking
that has been published on the web bulletin board; anyone
can retrieve the onion list, check that the hash matches that
on the receipt, and verify the reordering.
4.3.4 The anonymising mix process
The anonymising stage of the process runs analogously to
standard Preˆt a` Voter with re-encryption mixes, except that
to re-encrypt a vote it is necessary to re-encrypt each of the
k + 1 entries of the vote (including the ‘stop’ onion, which
might now be anywhere in the vote sequence). The teller
takes in a batch of ballot forms, re-encrypts each component
Esther
[[Duncan]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
[[Charlie]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKT
Figure 13. Uncovering the top preference
of each vote, and then mixes the batch (but leaves the intra-
vote ordering intact). The anonymised and mixed batch is
returned to the web bulletin board, and the teller repeats the
process. The second batch is then returned, and is passed
on to the next teller in the chain. This anonymising mix
process is audited in precisely the same way as with FPTP
and, as with FPTP, the whole anonymising mix and tallying
process can be audited as many times as required.
4.3.5 Tallying
Decryption of the votes for tallying purposes is done on a
strictly need-to-know basis. First, the hashes are removed,
and all first preferences are decrypted (by threshold decryp-
tion, as in standard Preˆt a` Voter with re-encryption mixes),
and the votes are sorted according to first preference. The
encrypted vote in the right-hand column of Figure 12 thus
becomes as in Figure 13: Esther’s name is now visible at the
top. (The shaded elements of the sequence are encrypted
onions, and so no-one, including individual tellers, can see
inside them.)
The candidate attracting the fewest votes is eliminated
in the usual STV fashion; these votes now need to be re-
distributed. For each vote that is to be redistributed, the
eliminated first preference is removed from the head of the
sequence, and moved to last place to make the length of the
sequence the same as before. (Since this is now in position k
in the sequence and there are only k − 1 candidates remain-
ing, this element will never be called upon to be decrypted.
Its only purpose is to provide padding so that no-one can tell
from the length of the sequence how many times this vote
has been transferred.) The new first place in the list, repre-
senting the second choice by the voter, is now decrypted. If
Esther is the eliminated candidate then our vote becomes as
depicted in Figure 14. The cells shaded in light grey, as be-
fore, show encrypted onions that no-one can read; the cell
shaded in dark grey shows an encrypted onion that has been
moved from the top to the bottom, and whose only remain-
ing purpose is to serve as padding.
These votes are now added to the appropriate piles; in
the case of our example ballot form, the vote will be added
to Duncan’s pile. Any pile that has been added to is now
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Duncan
[[Bob]]PKT
[[STOP]]PKT
[[Charlie]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKT
[[Esther]]PKT
Figure 14. Eliminating Esther
STOP
[[Charlie]]PKT
[[Alice]]PKT
[[Esther]]PKT
[[Duncan]]PKT
[[Bob]]PKT
Figure 15. Running out of preferences
completely remixed: each component of each vote is re-
encrypted, and the whole pile is mixed. It is now impossible
for anyone to distinguish first preferences from transferred
second preferences. The only visible part of our ballot form
is Duncan’s name at the top, and the onions have been re-
encrypted so no-one can pattern-match on them; this ballot
form cannot now be distinguished from any of the others in
the pile.
The process continues, with elimination of the candidate
now holding the smallest pile. At each stage, transferred
votes are thoroughly mixed into the pile, so that votes can-
not be traced. The mixing process is exactly the same as
happens before the tallying process, and it is audited in ex-
actly the same way.
When a ‘stop’ onion is decrypted, that vote is then trans-
ferred to the pile of discarded votes, and it takes no further
part in the tally. Our example ballot form will reach this
stage after the elimination (in some order) of Esther, Dun-
can and Bob; it will then read as the ballot form in Fig-
ure 15.
From the point of the second elimination onwards, it
is possible that when the new top preference is decrypted
it turns out to be a vote for a candidate that has already
been eliminated. The (usual) STV semantics require that
this eliminated candidate cannot receive the vote, and so
the next preference needs to be looked at; the procedure
here is to collect together into a single pile all of the votes
that are now for already eliminated candidates, remove the
head of the list, move it to the back to pad it to the proper
length again, and perform an anonymous re-encryption mix
before decrypting the next preference down. This prevents
the problem of revealing several preferences in a row from
the same ballot form if the next few preferences are all for
eliminated candidates. This anonymous re-encryption mix
is naturally audited in the same way as the mix process that
comes before the tallying stage.
4.3.6 Analysis
The advantages of operating in this fashion are consider-
able. We look at each of the problems of Section 4.2.2 in
turn.
Unused preferences. These simply never get decrypted at
all, meaning that they cannot be used for covert chan-
nels. Once a candidate has been elected, the tallying
process stops; this means that no preferences below the
winning candidate will ever be decrypted. The lazy de-
cryption ensures that a preference always stays hidden
until it is needed for the count.
Transfer history. Italian-style attacks are rendered impos-
sible because the whole decrypted vote is never seen:
we see that at the first stage some votes are transferred
from A to B, and that at the second stage some are
transferred from B to C, but we never discover how
many (if any at all) are transferred from A to B and
then to C. The transfer history is never disclosed to
anyone.
Absolute rankings. We also never learn the absolute rank-
ing of the decrypted votes (except when required by
the STV semantics—so, for example, we learn that the
first preferences are indeed first preferences because
they are decrypted before any transfers have taken
place). We cannot tell, when a vote is transferred from
A to B, how many of the previously eliminated candi-
dates were listed above A on this ballot form.
There is one further advantage to this scheme over the
FPTP re-encryption mix Preˆt a` Voter. With FPTP, and ran-
dom index values in the onions, it was necessary to ensure
that the initial seed values were drawn from a particular bi-
nomial distribution in order to make the tallying tractable.
There are no such issues here. Treating each ranking as a
separate onion renders this unnecessary. (It should be noted
that work by Ryan [7] written concurrently with this paper
solves this for FPTP Preˆt a` Voter by using Paillier encryp-
tion rather than ElGamal.)
One minor problem remains: it is still possible to tell
from the receipt how many preferences were indicated on
the ballot form. If the system allows zero preferences to be
made, effectively making this a spoilt ballot, it is possible
for a coercer to force particular voters unsympathetic to his
cause to lose their votes, by insisting that they come out of
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the booth with a blank receipt voting. This can be solved,
at the expense of a minor complication of the voting pro-
cess. For each ballot paper, an extra ‘candidate’ is included
on the form, in a random place, labelled ‘STOP COUNTING
HERE’ or some such. The ‘stop’ onion should then be lo-
cated at this position in the ballot form’s list of onions rather
than appearing as an extra onion at the end. The semantics
of creating a vote are now the same as before, with onions
being added to the vote sequence in order of the candidates
they represent, but after the ‘stop’ onion is added, the rest
of the preferences can be filled in arbitrarily, because they
will never be decrypted. A receipt can thus be produced that
contains a full ranking regardless of how many candidates
the voter wanted to indicate. The voter will know in what
position the ‘stop’ candidate appeared, and so will know
how many preferences will be included in the count; but a
third party will not know this and so will not be able to dis-
tinguish a spoilt ballot (a ‘1’ next to the ‘stop’ onion) from
a fully ranked ballot (with the ‘stop’ onion in last place).
There are two ways to achieve this. One is to allow the
booth device to see where the ‘stop’ onion is so that the
voter can indicate a partial ranking and the booth can add
the ‘stop’ onion and the remaining places. (If this route is
followed, a deterministic method of filling the remaining
places may be required to avoid the possibility of a covert
channel emanating from the booth machine. The simplest
option is to require the booth to fill in the remaining places
from top to bottom; since the candidate list has been ran-
domised, this will still result in random padding of the list.)
This may be regarded as unsatisfactory because one of the
design goals of Preˆt a` Voter is that the booth machine should
know nothing about the vote, and this would ideally include
how many candidates have been indicated.
The other method, of course, is to insist on the voter fill-
ing in a complete ranking, including the ‘stop’ onion and
any remaining places. This gives the voter a way to specify
a partial ranking, but now the booth machine does not need
to know the position of the ‘stop’ onion, and the receipt
bears no information about how many candidates were in-
dicated. This is much to be preferred if the burden on the
poor voter is not deemed too great.
Forcing the voter to complete the whole sheet is not con-
sidered problematic in Australia, where voting is compul-
sory and a complete ranking must be specified. Australia
has no notion of a ‘stop’ onion, so here the voter is required
to specify preferences that might affect the result of the elec-
tion. Disaffected and disinterested Australian voters often
fulfil their statutory obligation by simply filling in the boxes
down the page in increasing order, starting with a ‘1’ at the
top; it is to minimise the effect of these ‘donkey votes’ that
the candidate names appear in a random order on the form.
4.3.7 STV elections with multiple seats
This paper has concentrated entirely on STV elections in
which only a single winner is returned. The reason for this
is that the usual STV semantics for elections to fill more
than one seat involves transferring fractions of a vote. This
is not easy to achieve without making it rather harder to hide
the transfer history of a ballot form.
When only a single seat is to be filled, a candidate is
declared the winner as soon as he has more than half of
the votes. The quota for declaring a candidate elected is
thus the smallest integer strictly greater than half of the to-
tal number of votes cast. Here, the quota serves only as a
means for determining when one may stop tallying because
the future course of vote transfers could not affect the result.
With more than one seat, there are various methods of
calculating what the quota should be, but typically for an
n-seat election with w votes cast the quota will be just over
w
n
votes. The procedure when someone hits quota is rather
more complicated than with a single seat election.
The STV principle is that votes should not be wasted: if
a vote cannot be used for one candidate because that can-
didate has been eliminated, the vote should be transferred
elsewhere. This equally applies to votes that exceed the
quota: the vote surplus, the votes that a candidate has at-
tracted beyond the minimum required to elect him, should
also be transferred elsewhere. If this were not done, there
would be considerable scope for tactical voting, because
one might consider that one’s favoured candidate was all
but certain to be elected, and that one might therefore be
better off voting for someone else to avoid one’s vote being
‘stuck’ on the favoured candidate’s unnecessarily large pile
of votes.
Transferring the surplus is not a case of simply trans-
ferring the last few votes to reach the elected candidate,
however. All votes in the pile should be considered equally
suitable for transfer. What is usually done is to transfer a
fraction of each vote in the pile to its next indicated candi-
date, so that every vote is partially transferred and the total
remaining exactly meets the quota. If the quota is 34 votes
and the candidate has 47 votes, then the vote surplus is 13
votes, and so 1347 of each of the 47 votes is transferred. In a
manual and paper-based count, the value of the vote (in this
case, 1347 ) would be noted on the top of the ballot form, and
the form would be moved to the next pile down.
With each occurrence of a candidate hitting quota, the
arithmetic can become more and more convoluted. When
the second candidate achieves quota, his vote count will
include many ‘whole’ votes but may also include some of
the ballot forms worth only 1347 of a vote. If this candidate
has 36 1347 votes, his vote surplus is 2
13
47 ; we must therefore
transfer 2 1347/36
13
47 =
107
1705 of each vote. Some of these
transferred votes were whole votes, so are now worth 1071705 ;
some, however, were worth only 1347 of a vote, so are now
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worth 1347 · 1071705 = 139180135 .
It is, of course, not difficult to keep track of this algorith-
mically and to ensure that the computer-based tallying is
free from the errors that (as one might well imagine) plague
STV manual paper counts. The problem is that the value of
the vote needs to be kept along with the vote itself, and this
means that some information can be gained about the trans-
fer history of a vote. Since usually the vote surpluses for
each candidate will turn out to be different, one can tell,
from looking at a vote’s remaining value, which surplus
transfers it has been involved in so far.
One might well be prepared to live with this. The in-
formation gained by someone watching the tallying is not
much, and it is still extremely unlikely that anyone will be
able to reconstruct enough of a decrypted ballot form to be
of any use.
If not, there is a way to avoid the information leak,
though it comes at a price. When the first candidate to be
elected has a surplus of s over a quota of q, we need to trans-
fer s
s+q of each of his votes. Rather than split the vote by
duplicating it and noting that the one transferred is worth
s
s+q and the one left for the elected candidate is worth
q
s+q ,
we can start by replicating every vote in the whole election
s+q−1 times, so that each vote is now a collection of s+q
votes. For the votes being partially transferred, we trans-
fer s of the replicated votes and leave q behind. (That the
votes are copies does not matter: the next stage is to perform
an anonymous mix on each pile, and after that we will no
longer be able to tell which votes are copies of which.) We
also scale up the quota by s + q. Now every vote is a whole
vote again, and we proceed as normal until the elimination
of the next candidate, after which we will end up scaling
the votes again. This continues until the final candidate is
elected.
This approach completely solves the problem of the in-
formation leak: we are back to a situation where only the
bare minimum of information needed for the tallying is re-
vealed. The only awkwardness is that the number of votes
in the system gets big very quickly. With a large electorate,
this method could cope with a small number of seats, but
the data storage would rapidly get out of hand.
Improving on this is the subject of current research. A
forthcoming paper will detail a rather better solution that
keeps the vote values secret but avoids the vote replication.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have shown how single transferable
votes may be elegantly and efficiently incorporated into Preˆt
a` Voter. The size of the vote is linear in the number of candi-
dates, so there is no significant strain on resources in terms
of network activity. More importantly, the lazy decryption
semantics ensures that no information is uncovered about
the vote beyond what is necessary to complete the tallying,
and the anonymous mix at each stage of the tallying pre-
vents tracing of a ballot form through the tallying process
so that even the preferences that are decrypted cannot be
used to recreate whole decrypted ballot forms.
In addition, we retain all the advantages of the re-
encryption mix incarnation of Preˆt a` Voter, including the
distributed ballot creation, the on-demand printing of ballot
forms, and the ability to run each audit as many times as
is required; we also avoid the awkwardness that the FPTP
version has of requiring the initial index values inside the
onion to be drawn from a particular probability distribution.
The nature of the Preˆt a` Voter ballot form lends itself
to being extended to cover voting systems requiring a full
ranking; the question this paper answers is one of how to
rework the underlying cryptography. Some other e-voting
systems would be much harder to adapt to STV right from
the start, because the physical process of casting a ballot is
not designed to support it. Adapting Punchscan to support
ranking nine candidates, for instance, would seem to require
setting up a nine-by-nine grid on the ballot form2, so that the
voter can select one letter in the first row, one in the second,
and so on; this would work but might be beyond the wit of
many voters to complete. It is not clear how to adapt Three-
Ballot without scaling up the number of ballot forms that
need to be filled in; voters might have difficulty in complet-
ing the TwentySevenBallot voting process correctly.
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